The Gigafactory That Birmingham Still Hasn’t Won
The West Midlands should be leading Britain’s electric future. Instead, it is still waiting for a gigafactory that logic says should already be here.
Why, in the one part of Britain that still instinctively understands how to make things, are we still talking about a gigafactory as an idea rather than watching one being built? The West Midlands has the skills, the supply chains, the engineering base, and the history to justify it more than almost anywhere else in the country, and yet the cranes are not there, the investor has not signed, and the future we keep being told is inevitable still feels strangely out of reach. So what is really going on, and why has something that appears so obvious proved so difficult to deliver?
Part of the confusion starts with the name itself, because “gigafactory” sounds grand, technical, and slightly mysterious when in truth the basic idea is simple. It is just a very large battery factory. The “giga” part refers to gigawatt-hours, which is how you measure the amount of battery power it can produce, in other words, the scale is enormous. Instead of making a few components, it is producing the energy systems that power entire fleets of vehicles. But that simplicity hides something important, because this is not just a bigger version of a car plant, it is a completely different kind of industrial operation altogether.
A traditional factory assembles. A gigafactory creates. It takes raw materials and turns them into the battery itself, building the chemistry layer by layer, in a process that sits somewhere between manufacturing, chemical engineering, and electrical conditioning. Inside, materials are coated onto thin metal sheets, dried in long, energy-hungry ovens, cut, stacked, sealed, and then brought to life through controlled charging. Thousands upon thousands of battery cells are effectively switched on in carefully managed cycles so they perform properly, and that process alone consumes vast amounts of electricity. Add to that the need to keep the air almost completely dry, to control temperature precisely, and to run everything continuously without interruption, and what you have is not an assembly line but something much closer to a chemical plant and a power station combined, operating at industrial scale.
That matters because it explains why these factories are so fiercely contested and why they do not simply go where logic says they should. The West Midlands, on paper, looks almost perfect. There is Jaguar Land Rover, there are suppliers, there are universities, there is the accumulated knowledge of generations who have spent their lives making complex, high-value products. If you were drawing a map of where such a facility ought to sit, this region would be one of the first places you would circle. And yet, for all that, there is still no factory, no committed manufacturer, no sense that a final decision has been taken.
What there is instead is a site, and a good one, which is part of the frustration because it allows everyone to pretend that progress is further along than it really is. Land has been identified, plans have been drawn, infrastructure is being worked through, Coventry Airport rebadged as a future hub of battery production. It all looks reassuringly real in presentations and press releases. But a site is not a factory, a plan is not an investment, and an expectation is not a strategy. Until someone commits the money, signs the contracts, and starts building, it remains a well-prepared opportunity waiting for someone else to decide its future.
Elsewhere, that decision has already been made, and this is where the comparison stops being comfortable and starts becoming instructive. In Somerset, a deal was struck and construction began, backed by serious government support and a clear industrial intent. In Sunderland, expansion continues as part of a long-standing strategy built around Nissan, a partnership that has been nurtured and reinforced over decades. These are not speculative projects or hopeful bids, they are outcomes that reflect alignment between government, industry, and place. The West Midlands, by contrast, remains in a holding pattern, not because it lacks the ingredients, but because it has not yet combined them into something that an investor cannot ignore.
And that brings us to the part that is easiest to avoid but hardest to dismiss, the question of political behaviour and focus. If this were truly the defining industrial priority for the region, it would be impossible to miss. It would dominate the language of local politics, it would be raised repeatedly and persistently in Parliament, it would be carried by MPs who treat it not as one issue among many but as the economic question that shapes everything else. There would be coordination, repetition, pressure applied not once but again and again until it becomes unavoidable.
That is not what we see. What we see instead is a kind of polite interest, a recognition that this matters, but not the kind of urgency that turns interest into action. A mention here, a question there, a line in a speech, enough to signal awareness but not enough to create momentum. Across nearly thirty MPs, there is no sense of a unified bloc acting with shared purpose, no sense that this is the fight that defines the region’s future. And politics, like industry, responds to pressure. Where pressure is focused and sustained, outcomes follow. Where it is not, opportunities drift, slowly and quietly, towards those who are asking more clearly and more forcefully.
The same lack of sharpness can be seen in the region’s institutional voice. The West Midlands Combined Authority was created to bring coherence and strength to regional decision-making, to ensure that the West Midlands could act as a single economic entity when it needed to. Yet on the question of battery manufacturing, that voice has too often been absorbed into broader language about green growth and innovation, language that is safe, agreeable, and ultimately too soft for the kind of competition that is taking place. Other regions are not asking politely. They are making demands, backed by clear proposals and political will.
And this is not a domestic competition, it is a global one. The United States has deployed vast subsidies to attract battery production, effectively reshaping the economics of the sector overnight. Europe has responded with its own packages, ensuring that investment does not simply flow elsewhere. Against that backdrop, Britain has acted, but not with the same scale or clarity, and investors notice that. They are not guided by sentiment or history. They are guided by cost, certainty, and speed. They ask where energy will be cheapest not just today but for the next twenty years, where infrastructure will be delivered reliably, where government support will not shift with the political weather.
This is where the uncomfortable economics begin to bite. A gigafactory is not just a large building, it is an energy-hungry system that runs continuously, drawing power at a scale that makes electricity cost a defining factor in its viability. If that energy is expensive, the entire business case shifts. If it is uncertain, the risk increases. If it is both, investors look elsewhere. This is not about shaving margins, it is about whether the numbers work at all over the life of the plant. And when you place the West Midlands into that global calculation, alongside locations in the United States or Eastern Europe where energy is cheaper and subsidies are clearer, you begin to see why logic alone is not winning the argument.
None of this means the opportunity has gone. The fundamentals are still there, the need is still there, and the logic has not changed. But it does mean that the outcome is not inevitable, and that is perhaps the most important point of all. The belief that a gigafactory will arrive because it makes sense is precisely the thing that risks preventing it from happening. Industries do not move on the basis of logic alone, they move on the basis of decisions, and those decisions are shaped by pressure, by cost, and by certainty.
Without local battery production, the West Midlands faces a slower, more subtle risk, not the sudden loss of its automotive base, but its gradual erosion. Assembly may remain for a time, but the deeper value, the chemistry, the intellectual property, and the long-term investment will follow the batteries. That is how industrial shifts happen, not with a dramatic collapse, but with a steady movement that becomes visible only when it is too late to reverse.
The West Midlands is not there yet, but it is closer than many would like to admit. And if there is to be a different outcome, it will not come from assumption or heritage, it will come from a decision, taken clearly and pursued relentlessly, that this region will secure its place in the next industrial era and do whatever is required to make that happen.
Until then, the gigafactory remains what it has been for some time now.
Not a failure.
Not yet.
But not a reality either.




So it looks like we are a third world nation nowadays but can rejoice that our public affairs and public relations is second to none... time to leave and if they are still on, turn off the lights as you go ☹️
I have already explained why the giga factory won’t happen. David makes the case as I did about the cost of energy… then there is water… Giga factories need a lot of water as coolant. it rains a lot in Somerset whereas all Birmingham relies on the Welsh for its water supply. Then there is logistics. Somerset and Sunderland are both coastal places. It is easy to drop bulk precious metals off at a port and the finished product is easily transported by sea to wherever. Since most very heavy batteries will be for export that is a problem for a land locked place like Brum… as to the Birmingham City development… what’s the point of a new stadium for a lowly division club… who will probably never get into the Premier League… the present stadium is big enough for the Championship or Division 1… or is it a case of build and go bust, then ask the tax payer to fund the bill. Then the Digbeth development… first what do they mean by Digbeth… even Brummies get that wrong…. It is just the area to the east of the High Street running down to the river Rea. Most of it is a protected site, where development is restricted to no more than four stories and many of the buildings are listed (and thus development would not be economically viable… that is why it has not been developed already). As for the city centre project… what’s jobs??? Low skilled waiters and waitresses? Unemployment has risen every month under this government… and today the employment rate for young people has risen to the highest rate since the post 2008 recession. And another recession beckons. Best for the young to emigrate to a low taxation economy where there will be no recession such as Dubai or Singapore or even the USA where growth this year will be 3.5% something that this country can only look up in the history books. No they will build the houses but the office blocks will remain empty or turned into social housing or cheap hotels as on the Hagley Road by the Oratory…